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TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

EVERY SOCIAL SYSTEM IS AN AUTOMATION
Eckehart K'ohler
Department of Philosophy
University of Nebraska at Lincoln

The Purpose of this paper is to apply a branch of mathematics which has
recently come to the fore in investigations in the social sciences, namely
automata theory. This application will show how automata theory may be
used in the formal description of a wide variety of social phenomena.
My basic plan will be to start by describing a broad class of social system~
in terms of game-theoretical notions, especially the notions of strategy and
strategy mixture. Then I will define automata and show how, under a certain
translation of terms, every social system of the class I have taken turns out to
be an automaton.
Let us first introduce certain notions of game theory: we take a certain
set of external states G~which are potentially relevant to the behavior of any
participant in a social system at any time t, where m is the number of such
states. We will consider the set of states to contain a record of all past
behavior of all participants in the social system, so that any particular
participant can consider this in making his future decisions. We let In be the
set of n participants and Si the strategy set of the ith participant. The strategy
set includes all possible actions that a participant might undertake under the
various circumstances he might observe to hold and which are elements of the
set G~ of external states.
Now as is well known, in many social situations, it is preferable to
randomize one's choice of actions so as not to let those with whom one might
be in competition be able to predict perfectly one's own actions, since the
opponents might then take advantage of their perfect knowledge. If, for
example, a batter in a baseball game knew exactly what sequence of curves
and fastballs a pitcher were going to throw, he would certainly raise his
batting average. Now the problem of randomizing strategies involves the
introduction of probability in order to at least describe the proportion of the
kinds of actions one chooses, even if their exact sequences be random. Even
though an observer could not predict any individual actions the participant
might undertake, he would still know their proportions and therefore the
probability that any particular action will be undertaken. The set of
probabilities describing the actions of participant i is called a strategy mixture
and is designated by 'af,t" which is a function of external state or
circumstance k and time t.
At this point we consider an important property of the class of social
systems we wish to analyze in this paper. This property is descriptive of those
systems whose behavior has a certain minimal stability. This stability is such
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that all participants in the social system develop certain fixed strategy
mixtures which they then retain during the rest of their participation in the
social system. We assume that the participants, depending on their personalities, begin their participation with a predisposition towards certain mixtures,
which are then changed to new mixtures according to information received in
the course of participation and according to other inherent predispositions.
Looked at formally, this means we may ascribe to each participant i a
transition probability for each strategy mixture uf,t that i will accept it,
based on his observation of a prior state of the world, viz. a member of G~ I.
and his former acceptance of another strategy mixture
t- I.
It should be mentioned here that the question of stability plays a central
role in game-theoretical and decision-theoretical investigations. The approach
usually taken in this regard is to apply the notion of dominance to see if a
social system defined by the values held by its participants tends to develop
stability. The simplest case to investigate is the one where it can be calculated
that one strategy dominates all others, and we are also sure that it will
eventually be chosen. Other cases are more complicated, e.g. where
dominance holds for given strategies only among restricted subsets of the
entire set of strategies. I cannot go more deeply into these issues here, but
refer those interested in this problem to standard works, such as those of
Luce and Raiffa (1) and Fishburn (2). It suffices for the discussion at hand to
assume that stability exists for the class of social systems we are treating here
and to see what consequences this has in a more formal way.
Let us now recapitulate in a list the concepts we have been discussing:

of,

G~

set of m possible external states at time t, including a record of payoffs
for all strategies used by participants prior to t

In

set of n participants in the social system

Si

strategy set of ith participant

of,t m·n strategy mixtures at time t, viz. a probability for each participant i
and state k for each strategy si ,h € Si such that

of,t (si,h) ~ 0

and

~

of,t (Si,h) = I

pf,t m·n transition probabilities from

G~ X {uf'J

to fr,t+ ~

Using the concepts discussed above, we can now define stability of a
social system as occurring whenever all participants in that system, after a
preliminary period of adjustment, settle down on a single strategy mixture.
Formally, this may be defined as follows: if we let F be the set of stable
strategy mixtures, it will have the following property:
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Now it will be my purpose to show that stable social systems as
characterized above are probabilistic automata (3). To do this, I define
probabilistic automata, and then we examine the stable social systems to see
if they have the defining properties of probabilistic automata. These are
defined as follows. Basically, an automaton is any process which begins in
some state, is stimulated by an input and thereupon enters into a new state.
The rule which governs its changes of state is given by a transition function
M. Furthermore, an automaton is defined by the initial state it is in (because
being in one rather than another initial state may prevent it from ever going
into some states); and the automaton is defined by a set F of final states,
which may be called its "goal states." Formally, we define probabilistic
automata (where the transitions given by M are not onto definite states, but
only onto probabilities of states, which is approp;iat~ where transitions are
indeterministic) as follows: a = (E, A, M, aO F) is a probabilistic automaton
iffdf

-

=

~o,···,~p

is the set of (elementary) inputs

A
= aO, .. " aq is the set of (internal) states
M is a transition function onto probabilities, from A X E onto [0,1] q+l
(this is a q+l matrix), such that for any pair (a,n fAX E;
M(a,n = (PO(a,n,.·., Pq(a,m, and Ph(a,n ;;. 0 and ~ Ph(a,~)

=I

aO is the initial (internal) state of a
F is the set of final states

Let us see how the stable social systems may be understood as automata.
Perhaps the basic step is to determine what in the social system is to be taken
as its internal state. As a preliminary step, we might consider the case of a
single participant. Clearly, the state of the individual participant which
interests us is whichever strategy mixture he has chosen for his actions; and
the external stimulus which guides his actions is the state Sk f Gm which
holds at that time. We may assume that G m is the same for everyone, and
that in particular, the past actions of other participants is public knowledge
for all participants. Everyone acts on the same knowledge about external
events, and hence the external state Sk can be taken as the input for the
social system as a whole. But what about the internal state of the social
system? This is determined by the internal states of all the participants, and
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hence may be taken as the n-tuple of alI n participants' strategy mixtures at
any time, viz. (af,t ,... , a~,t). The set of all these n-tuples corresponds to the
set A of internal states of the automation. The set Gm corresponds to the set
::: of external inputs. The individual probability functions pf,t do not
correspond directly to the transition function M because the latter yields
probabilities of internal states of the automaton, whereas the former is a
probability function merely of an individual participant's internal state. What
we need is a probability of the n-tuple of strategy mixtures which is the
internal state of the social system: this is what we are interpreting as the
automaton, and not the individual participant. For this purpose, a new
probability function is introduced, pk,t, which is determined by the pf,t,s,
and is a function of (af,t ,... , a~,t). The set of alI these new P functions
corresponds to the domam of the automaton's transition function M, so that
we have the following situation: for every n-tuple of strategy mixtures which
hold for the social system at any time t and for every state of the world, that
is, for every (ak,t ,... , a~,t) and Sk, there is a uniquely determined
pk,t(
a~+ This is in accord with the characterization of stable -social
systems as given above.

at 1,... , 1).

Two concepts remain for the interpretation of the social system as
automata: the initial and final states. The final states of the automaton
clearly correspond to the set F of stable strategy mixtures. The initial states
simply correspond to the n-tuple of strategy mixtures to which the
participants are predisposed at the very beginning of their participation,
however these are determined: whether by chance or by inherited instinct or
by learning from previous participations in other social systems.
The upshot of our investigation may be set down in the following list,
which gives the automaton-interpretation of our social systems which we had
been looking for:
Probabilistic Automaton

Stable Social System

A = [ao, ... , aql

[(a~ ,0, ... , a,;'O) , ... , (af,t q ,... , a~,tq)l

2: = [~O'···' ~pl
M

Gm = [SI ,... , Sml
[pI ,0, ... , pm,tql

F

F

° °

(a I'···'

an)

My conclusion is that the interpretation of stable social systems as
automata succeeds, because it has been shown that they satisfy all the formal
defining conditions of automata. It may be meutioned that there are other
ways to interpret social systems as automata, such as a way developed by
Werner Leinfellner. This approach views social systems more from the point
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of view of value theory for an individual, and the system is analyzed as a
participant playing against the rest of the social system; his strategies are the
internal states, the strategy n - I-tuples of the rest of the system are the
external states, and the transition functional domain consists of evaluations
the individual makes knowing his previous strategy mixture and the strategy
mixtures of the other participants.
The principle outcome of this paper is to show how a new and fruitful
mathematical technique may be applied to the analysis of social systems. It is
not to present any particular social facts, but rather a way to come by them
in the future.
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